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Abstract
We study the occurrence of shocks in a common groundwater resource problem
using a dierential game. In particular, we use Rubio and Casino's adaptation of the
Gisser and Sánchez model where we introduce a sudden change in the dynamics of the
resource, namely a decrease in the recharge rate of the aquifer. We compare the pareto
optimal solution with open-loop and feedback equilibria. First, we show analytically
how dierent solutions, at the steady state, depend on the intensity of the shock.
Moreover, we show that the cost and the strategic eects are decreasing functions of
the intensity of the shock, i.e. that all the solutions get closer at the steady state for
more intense shocks. We nally apply the game to the particular case of the Western
La Mancha aquifer. The aim of this application is to estimate how shocks inuence
the ineciency of open loop and feedback strategies in terms of welfare. We show
that this ineciency decreases the earlier the shock occurs or the higher the intensity
of the shock.
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1 Introduction
In this paper, we study the exploitation of a common groundwater resource as a dieren-
tial game in order to take into account the strategic and dynamic interactions between the
users of the resource. Specically, we consider a groundwater resource used for irrigation
by several farmers. Common groundwater resources are often exploited under a common
property regime, that is the access is restricted to land owners situated over the aquifer.
Numerous papers have studied this issue (for example Gisser and Sánchez (1980) [4], Negri
(1989) [8], Provencher and Burt (1993) [11], Rubio and Casino (2001) [12]) and have con-
cluded that private exploitation is inecient, in terms of stock and welfare, in comparison
to optimal exploitation.
This ineciency is due to the various externalities which appear because of the sharing
of this type of resource, namely the pumping cost externality which characterizes the fact
that withdrawals made by one farmer lower the water-table level, resulting in an increase
in pumping costs for the other users. On the other hand, the stock externality, also
called strategic externality, represents competition between farmers because of the limited
availability of the water stock (see Provencher and Burt (1993) [11]).
Gisser and Sánchez (1980) [4] showed the ineciency of private exploitation for the
Pecos River Basin, New Mexico. They also characterized the analytical dierence between
the optimal and private solutions, and they concluded that the dierence is negligible if the
capacity of the aquifer is large. Nieswiadomy (1988) [9] called this consideration the Gisser
and Sánchez eect (GSE), see Koundouri (2004) [5] for an overview. The most important
policy implication derived from this study is that regulation of a common groundwater
resource is not justied if the dierence of welfare from private and optimal exploitations
is insuciently important. However, authors assume that farmers behave myopically in
the calculation of the private solution, that is, farmers take decisions over a short period
of time, without considering the impact of the other users on the available stock.
Several studies have used game theory to take into account the strategic and dynamic
interactions between the resource users when computing the private solution (for example
Negri (1989) [8], Provencher and Burt (1993) [11], Rubio and Casino (2001) [12]). In [8],
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Negri characterizes analytical solutions of the water-table level at the steady state for two
types of Nash equilibria, open-loop and feedback solutions, and for the socially optimal
case, also referred as pareto optimal case in the literature. He shows that the dierence
between the socially optimal solution and the open-loop solution is positive and captures
the pumping cost externality. Moreover, he shows that the dierence between the open-loop
solution and the feedback solution is also positive and captures the strategic externality.
The dierence between the socially optimal and the feedback solutions is then positive and
represents the ineciency of private exploitation. Provencher and Burt [11] take up Negri's
ideas to prove, in a general way, that if the objective function of the problem is concave, the
feedback solution is inecient, in comparison with the socially optimal solution. In [12],
Rubio and Casino adapt the Gisser and Sánchez model as a dierential game and derive
analytical solutions of the socially optimal, open loop and feedback cases over an innite
planning horizon. They also conrm Negri's result: strategic behaviour exacerbates the
ineciency of private solutions. Moreover, they conrm the Gisser-Sánchez rule when the
strategic externality is considered: for large aquifers, the dierent solutions get closer at
the steady state.
The motivation of our work is based on the idea that some exogenous threats are not
taken into account in previous studies, as for example the occurrence of regime shifts. We
focus on the study of the ineciency of the private solution with strategic and dynamic
interactions and in presence of an anticipated shock. More specically, we take Rubio and
Casino's game in [12] and we introduce a sudden change in the dynamics of the resource,
which leads to an abrupt decrease of the water availability for the users of the resource.
We model this shock as a decrease in the recharge of the aquifer. More generally, such a
shock corresponds to a regime shift. We then compare the pareto optimal solution with
open-loop and feedback Nash equilibria.
In [1], de Frutos Cachorro et al. (2014) study how information about this type of
shock aects the optimal management of the water resource by a centralized regulator
(a water agency). For the deterministic case, when the date of the shock is known, the
water agency would prepare for the event by applying an incautious extraction strategy
before the occurrence of the shock. Such a result can already be found in the literature
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dealing with the impact of irreversible events (see Tsur and Zemel (2014) [15]), where the
phenomenon is known as the "impatience eect".
In this paper, we combine Rubio and Casino's game theory approach and de Frutos
Cachorro et al. study on the eect of regime shifts, in order to assess the dierence between
the pareto optimal and private solutions with strategic and dynamic interactions between
users.
We show that the combined eect of strategic interactions and this type of shock leads to
an overexploitation of the resource in the short, medium and long run. Moreover, we study
the ineciency of private exploitation with respect to the intensity and date of occurrence
of the shock. From an economic point of view, we could expect that the higher the intensity
of the shock, i.e. the lower the quantity of water available, the higher the overall pumping
costs and the competition between users. However, we show that cost and strategic eects
are particularly important for low-intense or later occurring shocks. Finally, we estimate
the ineciency of private exploitation in terms of welfare for a particular case, the Western
la Mancha aquifer. This aquifer is situated in the South of Spain, under a semi-arid climate
where dry periods are frequent. Moreover, in the last decades, the aquifer has suered from
various inecient regimes of exploitation. Our results suggest that some regulation of the
aquifer is justied. Indeed, although eciency gains from following the pareto optimal
solution are lower than in absence of shocks, they still reach several millions of Euros,
for example 37 millions of Euros in the situation of a mid-intensity shock. The pareto
optimal solution could be implemented by imposing licenses, such that extractions over
time correspond to the pareto optimal extractions.
This paper is organized in the following way. In section 2, we present Rubio and
Casino's game and introduce the case of an exogenous and deterministic shock therein.
In section 3, we describe analytical resolutions of the problem for dierent information
structures. In section 4, we compute the pareto optimal solution corresponding to the
problem. In section 5, we rst compare the dierent analytical solutions, in terms of
long-term stocks. We then make a numerical application of the model to the Western La
Mancha aquifer with the aim to estimate, in terms of stocks and welfare, the ineciency of




First, we present the adaptation of the Gisser and Sánchez model (1980) [4] as a dierential
game developed by Rubio and Casino (2001, 2003) ([12], [13]). In [4], the demand for
irrigation water is a linear function,
g = a− bp, a, b > 0, (1)
where g represents water pumping, p, the price of water and a and b are parameters.
In [12], Rubio and Casino assume that the number of farmers, M, is xed and nite over
time. The individual demand for irrigation water can be described as a linear function,
gi = θi(a− bp), i = 1..M, (2)
where 0 < θi < 1 and
∑M






θi(a− bp) = a− bp = g. (3)















We assume that the marginal cost of extraction is a linear function that depends on G,
the stock of the aquifer. Total costs of extraction are then
C̄ = (z − cG)g, z, c > 0, (4)
where z is the sum of xed costs and the maximum marginal cost of extraction and c the
slope of the marginal pumping cost function. As z and c do not depend on the rate of
extraction, the individual pumping cost of the ith farmer is
C̄i = (z − cG)gi, z, c > 0. (5)
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The dynamics of the aquifer can be described as
Ġ = −(1− α)g + r = −(1− α)
M∑
i=1
gi + r, (6)
where r is the recharge rate and α the return coecient, α ∈ [0, 1).
Assuming that interactions between farmers are rational and non-cooperative, the problem
of the ith farmer is to maximize individual welfare, dened as the present value of his
future prots, where ρ is the discount rate, taking into account the dynamics of the aquifer














g2i − (z − cG)gi, (8)
Ġ = −(1− α)
M∑
i=1
gi + r, (9)
G(0) = G0 given, (10)
gi ≥ 0 G ≥ 0. (11)
Now, we disturb the system of the resource by introducing an exogenous and deter-
ministic shock in the dynamics of the aquifer, as proposed by de Frutos Cachorro et al.
(2014) [1]. This disturbance represents a sudden reduction on the recharge rate, r, at time
ta, known to the users. Thus, from ta on, the recharge rate switches from r = r1 to r = r2,
with r1 > r2. This can happen because of an exceptional extraction of groundwater for
other uses from ta on, as for example the construction of a reservoir or a transfer to another
river basin.





i=1 gi + r1 if t ≤ ta
−(1− α)
∑M
i=1 gi + r2 if t > ta,
(12)
with r1 > r2, Fi(G, gi) from equation (8), and conditions (10) and (11).
In what follows, we are going to solve the game including this shock when players
have dierent information structures: open-loop (OL) and feedback (FB), as in Rubio and
Casino (2001, 2003) ([12], [13]). In every case, we solve problems in two steps: between ta
and ∞ and between 0 and ta. We anticipate that equilibria of the various problems will
be dierent according to the structure of information used by players. We call adaptation
behavior the extraction decisions that are implemented by farmers from t=0 until the end
of the planning horizon, knowing from t=0 that a shock will occur at some xed ta
1.
3 Non-cooperative cases
3.1 Resolution of the open-loop case
We assume that farmers made a commitment at the initial instant (t = 0) about their path
of extractions over time. This is an open-loop information structure. The Hamiltonian
corresponding to the problem of the ith farmer is:
Hi =
 Fi(G, gi) + πi(t)(r1 − (1− α)
∑M
i=1 gi) if t ≤ ta
Fi(G, gi) + πi(t)(r2 − (1− α)
∑M
i=1 gi) if t > ta,
(13)
with Fi(G, gi) from equation (8), and πi(t), the adjoint variable. G(t) and πi(t) are con-
tinuous functions in the interval [0, ∞). We have detailed the analytical resolution of the
open-loop game in appendix A.
The open-loop solution supposes that the farmer does not change his extraction de-
cisions over the whole time horizon. This assumption is not very realistic whenever the
farmer can observe the resource stock, and then indirectly the actions of the other users
of the resource. If he acts strategically he might want to adapt to the other users' actions.
1On the other hand, we call non-adaptation behaviour, when farmers do not have information about
the shock until it happens and then change their extraction decisions just from the date of occurrence.
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As discussed in Negri [8], the open-loop solution does not allow to account for strategic
interactions among resource users, but the feedback solution does.
3.2 Resolution of the feedback case
In the feedback information structure, farmers observe the level of the resource during the
planning period, i.e. they have information about the state (or the water-table level) of the
resource over time. Indeed, in many cases of groundwater management, the water-table
level can be observed from the individual wells. Thus, it is more credible for the farmers
to maximize their prot assuming that actions or strategies made by the other farmers
depend not only on time but on the state of the groundwater resource. We are going to
solve this case on the basis of the principle of dynamic programming. The full resolution
of the problem is detailed in Appendix B.
4 The pareto optimum
One of the objectives of this paper being to estimate the ineciency of various equilibria
dened previously, we need to dene the ecient solution of the problem: the pareto
optimum. The dierence between the pareto optimal solution and any non-cooperative
solution will dene ineciency, either in terms of stocks or in terms of welfare. Ineciency
in terms of stocks is measured comparing steady state levels of stocks, while ineciency in
terms of welfare is measured comparing gains obtained over the whole time horizon.
For the pareto optimal solution, we suppose that a social planner decides how to manage
the resource. The problem for the regulator is to maximize the social welfare, dened as
the present value of the sum of future revenues of the M users of the resource.









with Fi(G, gi) described in equation (8), constrained by equation of motion (9), initial
condition (10) and positivity conditions (11).
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Now, if a shock occurs at the known date ta, the problem for the social planner be-
comes (14), constrained by the equation of motion (12), where r1 and r2 are values of
the recharge rate before and after ta, respectively, with initial and positivity conditions
described in equations (10) and (11). The full resolution of this problem is detailed in
Appendix C. As discussed in de Frutos Cachorro et al. (2014) [1], optimal adaptation
behavior in presence of such shocks is characterized by a more intense extraction behav-
ior in the short run (before the occurrence of the shock), namely "the impatience eect",
and a less intense extraction behavior in the long run, compared to the situation without
shocks. This is because the presence of a shock reduces the recharge rate, i.e. the water
available in the future, thus reducing extraction possibilities in the long run. In addition,
the "impatience eect" induces farmers to accelerate extraction in the short run to oset
future losses in the long run. One important issue is now to see whether this compensating
short-term behavior might be changed in case of non-cooperative solutions.
In what follows, we analyze and compare the pareto optimal solution with the dierent
equilibria (open-loop and feedback) obtained when such a shock takes place.
5 Results
5.1 Theoretical Results
In this section, we compare analytically the eciency of the dierent stock solutions at
the steady state. We remind that ineciency in terms of stocks is dened as the dierence
between steady-state stock levels obtained from the pareto optimal solution and dierent
private equilibria. From equations (67), (30), (52) in the Appendices, we obtain solutions
of the stock for the pareto optimum (PO), the open-loop (OL) and the feedback case (FB),



































with expressions b∗1 = b
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See Appendix D for more details about the positivity of the steady states and the proofs
of propositions of this section.









Proposition 1 When the value of the recharge rate upon occurrence of the shock, r2,
decreases (respectively increases), the level of the stock at the steady state decreases (re-
spectively increases) for the dierent cases (PO, OL and FB) and reaches the same limit
value when r2 goes to zero. Moreover, solutions of pumping rates at the steady state are
the same for the dierent information structures and decrease (respectively increase), the
lesser (respectively the greater) the value of r2.
Hence, the shock decreases steady state stock levels for both the pareto optimal solution
and the non-cooperative solutions. Negri shows in [8] that open-loop solutions, and in a
more important way feedback solutions, are inecient with respect to the pareto optimal
solution. We have now to study the dierence of the various solutions to further quantify
the eect of the shock on the dierent pumping strategies, or more specically, to analyze if
the ranking of eciency of solutions is maintained in presence of such a shock. Dierences










captures the pumping cost eect, while the dierence



















captures the strategic (or stock) eect.
Proposition 2 When a deterministic shock on the recharge rate takes place, the cost and
strategic eects are positive.
Proposition 2 shows that the cost and strategic eects are positive when there is a shift
on the recharge rate at a given date. This means that both non-cooperative solutions are
inecient, in terms of stocks, in presence of the shock. An important issue is now to study
how these ineciencies are inuenced by a change in the value of the shock.
Proposition 3 When r2 decreases (respectively increases), the cost and strategic eects
decrease (respectively increase).
Proposition 3 exposes one of our main results: it shows that pumping strategies, at the
steady state, derived from private and optimal solutions get closer if the aquifer recharge
decreases. This result might be counter-intuitive at rst sight as the occurrence of a shock
reduces the ineciency of the dierent non-cooperative solutions. It may be explained by
the fact that a reduction on the recharge rate, implies a reduction on the water available
to share in the future. Thus, ineciency cannot develop to the same extent as in a case
with greater water availability.
We remind that Rubio and Casino found the same expressions (19) and (20) in [12] in
their model without shock. They show rst that the dierence between solutions declines
as the discount rate and/or the number of farmers increases. They also conrm that the
same result is obtained when the storage capacity of the aquifer2 increases (GSE eect). In
this paper, we add to Rubio and Casino's result the importance of a recharge rate variation.
In order to correct this ineciency, instruments such as licences or quotas can be used
that bring the resource user to respect pareto optimal extraction paths. Let's consider
2In [12], the storage capacity of the aquifer corresponds to the expression G/H, where G is the volume
of water and H is the water-table height of the aquifer.
11
a non-transferable quota depending on the resource stock and take the example of the
feedback case.
Proposition 4 There exists an optimal quota ḡ(G) with ḡ = gPO, such that g = gPO is a
solution of the feedback problem, constraint by g ≤ ḡ.
Proposition 4 shows that an optimal quota ḡ(G) could be imposed in order to reach
the pareto optimal solution, and this quota corresponds to the pareto optimal extraction
path.
However, Gisser and Sanchez argued in [4] that regulation of a common groundwater
resource is not justied if the dierence of welfare from private and optimal exploitations
is insuciently important. In what follows, we apply our game to the Western la Mancha
aquifer in order to estimate ineciency in terms of welfare3 and not only in terms of stocks.
This application also allows us to estimate the magnitude of ineciencies, for shocks of
dierent intensities and occurring at dierent dates.
5.2 Numerical application
In this section, we use parameter values of the Western La Mancha aquifer (WLM) from
de Frutos Cachorro et al. (2014) [1], Esteban and Albiac (2011) [2] and Esteban and Dinar
(2012) [3]. The parameter values used are listed in Table 1.
Covering a surface area of 5 500 km2 in the South of Spain, the WLM aquifer is located
in a semi-arid region characterized by low and irregular rainfall and by high evapotran-
spiration due to the signicant number of sunny days (cf. López Sanz (1993) [7]). These
conditions give rise to a very low ecient recharge rate of the aquifer of around 20%
of precipitation. Moreover, drought episodes can be sustained over time, lasting several
years, as happened in 1980-1985 and 1990-1996 (cf. Olcina Cantos (2001) [10]). In the
last decades, the WLM aquifer witnessed a critical decrease in water-table levels, due to
3We remind that ineciency in terms of welfare is dened as the dierence between gains obtained
from the pareto optimal solution and the dierent private equilibria over the whole time horizon.
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the development of intensive irrigated agriculture, which increased groundwater extrac-
tion (3 thousand million m3 over the past three decades according to López-Gunn (2012)
[6]), coupled with inecient management regimes (Esteban and Albiac (2011) [2]). The
degradation of water-table levels has caused damage to aquatic ecosystems as the "Mancha
Húmeda" Biosphere reserve and also aects human uses downstream.
Parameters Description Units Value
b Water demand slope (Million Cubic Meters/Year)2 Euros−1 0.097
a Water demand intercept Million Cubic Meters/Year 4403.3
z Pumping costs intercept Euros/Million Cubic Meters 266 000
c Pumping costs slope Euros/(Million Cubic Meters)2 3.162
r Natural recharge Million Cubic Meters/Year 360
G0 Stock level (in volume) Million Cubic Meters 80960
H0 Current water table Meters 640
SL Surface elevation Meters 665
A Aquifer area Square Kilometers 5500
S Storativity coecient unitless 0.023
ρ Social discount rate Year−1 0.05
α Return ow coecient unitless 0.2
M Number of players unitless 2
Table 1: Values of parameters of the Western La Mancha aquifer.
In what follows, we rst estimate the ineciency, as dened in the previous section,
in terms of stocks, and then in terms of welfare. We also discuss the protability of the
dierent solutions until the date of the shock, that is gains obtained in [0, ta]. Moreover,
we complete this analysis by studying the problem when the intensity and the date of
occurrence of the shock vary.
In Figure 1, we observe optimal solutions of stock G∗(t) (on the left) and pumping










Figure 1: Solutions of G∗(t) (left-hand side) in millions of cubic meters and g∗(t) (right-
hand side) in millions of cubic meters per year : the pareto optimum (in green), the
open-loop (in blue) and the feedback (in red) cases, when r1 − r2 = 70 and ta = 20 years.
(OL) (in blue) and the feedback solutions (FB) (in red), for a shock of mid-intensity of
70 millions of cubic meters per year (Mm3/year), i.e. r1 = 360 and r2 = 290 at the 20
th
year of exploitation of the aquifer (ta = 20 years). In what follows, we use this shock as a
baseline case.4
Focusing on the left-hand side of the gure, we note that GPO(t) > GOL(t) > GFB(t)
for all t. This gives the ranking of eciency in terms of stocks. In particular at the steady
state, the pareto optimal stock reaches a level of 76 711 Mm3, which is higher than levels
obtained by the OL and FB solutions (of around 73 811 and 71 962 Mm3 respectively).
Thus, the dierence between the pareto optimal and the open-loop solutions is 2 899 Mm3
whereas the dierence between the pareto optimal and the feedback solutions is 4 749 Mm3.
We hence conrm theoretical results proved in Proposition 2: the cost and strategic eects
in the steady state remain positive when a shock takes place. Moreover, we observe on
4This choice is motivated by the fact that the decrease of the water-table obtained in ta = 20 can be
compared to the estimated drop of 3 000 Mm3 over the last 30 years reported by López-Gunn.
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the right-hand side that the pumping rate at the steady state is the same for the dierent
solutions, with a value of approximately 181 Mm3/year, as demonstrated in Proposition 1.
We can also analyze the problem before the occurrence of the shock, between t=0 and
t = ta = 20 years. On the right hand, we note that total extractions until the arrival of the
shock, measured by the areas under the curves in [0, ta], are higher in the feedback case (9
672 Mm3) than in the OL (8 383 Mm3) and PO (6 044 Mm3) solutions. This means that
the feedback strategy is the less conservative for the resource until ta = 20 years. In other
words, the "impatience eect", that is the increase of extractions before the occurrence
of the shock is most important in the feedback case, and least important in the pareto
optimal solution.
Let us now calculate the ineciency in terms of welfare of the private solutions5 over
the whole time horizon (in [0,∞)), as well as their protability before the occurrence of
the shock (in [0,ta]). Over the whole time horizon, the ineciency of the FB solution with
regard to the PO solution is estimated at 37 478 thousands of Euros and the ineciency
of the OL solution with respect to the PO solution at 14 393 thousands of Euros. This can
be seen in Table 2, column 3. Maybe more surprisingly, in [0,ta], the dierence of welfare
between the PO and FB solutions is positive, but the dierence between the PO and OL
solutions is negative, that is the OL strategy is more protable than the PO solution until
the occurrence of the shock, (as can be seen in Table 2 column 2). However, this result
is not related to the occurrence of the shock. To see why, let us illustrate the evolution
of the instantaneous welfare (in euros per year), dened as the function Fi(G, gi)e
−ρt in
equation (7), for the FB (in red), OL (in blue) and PO (in green) solutions in absence of
any shock. Figure 2 displays this evolution for dierent time intervals and Table 3 provides
the corresponding accumulative welfares (that is the area under the curve) of these zooms.
We see in Table 3 that until the 5th year of exploitation the most protable solution is the
FB solution, that gives up his position to the OL solution before the end of the 10th year.
It is not until the 30th year onward that the PO solution becomes the most protable.
This gives interesting insights in how the ineciency of private solutions is distributed
5Solutions of welfare in Tables 5 and 6 are associated to individual strategies.
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over time.6
[0, ta] [0, ∞]
PO 111 462 146 658
OL 114 886 132 265
FB 101 039 109 180
PO-OL -3 424 14 393
OL-FB 13 847 23 085
PO-FB 10 423 37 478
Table 2: Welfare (and dierences of welfare) obtained by the PO, OL and FB strategies
(respectively between solutions) in thousands of Euros, when r1− r2 = 70 and for the date
of occurrence ta = 20.
[0, 5] [0, 10] [0, 20] [0, 30]
PO 45 997 75 471 109 655 127 758
OL 66 880 93 282 114 894 124 670
FB 70 257 89 395 101 100 105 741
PO-OL -20 883 -17 811 -5 239 3 088
OL-FB -3 377 3 887 13 794 18 929
PO-FB -24 260 -13 924 8 555 22 017
Table 3: Welfare (and dierences of welfare) obtained by the PO, OL and FB strategies
(resp. between solutions) in thousands of Euros, for the problem without shock (r1 = r2 =
360) in [0, t] for t= 5, 10, 20 and 30.
In what follows, we analyze how previous results change according to the intensity and
date of occurrence of the shock.
6This does not mean that there is an optimal time in order to implement policy instruments. Policy
measures should be implemented over the whole planning horizon, as shown in Proposition 4, in order to















Figure 2: Evolution of F
′
i (G, gi) = Fi(G, gi)e
−ρt (in Euros per year) obtained by the
PO (in green), OL (in blue) and FB (in red) strategies for the problem without shock
(r1 = r2 = 360). Zoom in [0, 5] (left-top side), [0, 10] (right-top side), [0, 20] (left-bottom
side) and [0, 30] (right-bottom side).
5.2.1 Variation of the intensity of the shock
In this section, we compare the eciency, in terms of stocks and welfare, of the open-loop










Figure 3: Solutions of G∗(t) (left-hand side) in millions of cubic meters and g∗(t) (right-
hand side) in millions of cubic meters per year : the pareto optimum (in green), the
open-loop (in blue) and the feedback cases (in red), when r1− r2 = 210 and ta = 20 years.
simulate a shock of 210 Mm3/year, which is about 140 Mm3/year more intense than the
shock described in the previous section (and illustrated in Figure 1), but takes place at the
same date.
First of all, we analyze the problem at the steady state and quantify results presented
in propositions 2 and 3. We note that the cost and the strategic eects remain positive.
We also note that cost and strategic eects decrease with the more intense shock. Hence,
we numerically conrm one of our main theoretical result in Proposition 3: the greater
the value of the shock, the smaller the cost and strategic eects, dened as the dierences
between steady state stock solutions, and then the smaller the ineciency from private
solutions in terms of stocks. Moreover, we can observe that cost and strategic eects
are half as high as that of the mid-intense shock of 70 Mm3/year, which is three times
less intense. This means that cost and strategic eects do not vary proportionally with a
change on the intensity of the shock. Thus we add to the previous result the nding that
ineciency decreases with more intense shocks but less than proportionally. We conrm
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this in Table 4 where other simulations for shocks of dierent intensities are illustrated.
r1 − r2 0 30 70 210
PO-OL 3 600 3 300 2 899 1 500
OL-FB 2 295 2 104 1 850 956
PO-FB 5 895 5 404 4 749 2 456
Table 4: Dierences between stock values in millions of m3 at the steady state.
r1 − r2 0 30 70 210
[0, ta] [0, ∞] [0, ta] [0, ∞] [0, ta] [0, ∞] [0, ta] [0, ∞]
PO 109 655 153 534 110 446 150 451 111 462 146 658 114 666 136 234
OL 114 894 138 564 114 908 135 750 114 886 132 265 114 445 122 475
FB 101 100 112 269 101 074 110 879 101 039 109 180 100 900 104 637
PO-OL -5 239 14 970 -4 462 14 701 -3 424 14 393 221 13 759
OL-FB 13 794 26 295 13 834 24 871 13 847 23 085 13 545 17 838
PO-FB 8 555 41 265 9 372 39 572 10 423 37 478 13 766 31 597
Table 5: Welfare (and dierences of welfare) obtained by the PO, OL and FB strategies
(respectively between solutions) (in thousands of Euros) for dierent values of the shock
r1 − r2 and for the date of occurrence ta = 20.
Secondly, in Table 5, we can observe that the total welfare in [0,∞] decreases the more
intense the shock (columns 3, 5, 7 and 9 rst three rows). This result is logical in the sense
that after the occurrence of the shock, extractions decrease the higher the intensity of the
shock due to the decrease on water availability.
However, we can also observe that the dierences of total welfare between solutions in
[0, ∞] (columns 3, 5, 7 and 9, last three rows) decreases the more intense the shock. In
other words, the ineciency in terms of welfare is maximal for the case without shock. Let
us observe that the maximum of 41 265 (column 3 last row) exceeds by 3 787 thousands
Euros the value of the baseline case. Hence, we numerically show that the greater the
value of the shock, the smaller the dierences between solutions and then the smaller the
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ineciency, not only in terms of steady state stocks but also in terms of welfare. As we
advanced in section 5.1, this result is explained by the fact that the less abundant the water
to share in the future, the smaller the extend to which ineciencies from non-cooperative
users develop.
Now, we analyze extraction behavior before the occurrence of the shock (before ta) for
the various solutions illustrated in Figure 3. In [0, ta], total extractions in the feedback
case (9 757 Mm3) remain higher than in the OL (8 810 Mm3) and PO (6 474 Mm3) cases.
Moreover, in the three cases, we observe a more intense extraction behavior (see the right-
hand side of Figure 3) in comparison with the shock of mid-intensity of 70 Mm3/year (that
was illustrated in Figure 1). In particular, total extractions increase by 85, 427 and 4307
Mm3 for the FB, OL and PO cases respectively when the intensity of the shock increases by
around 140 Mm3/year. We can conrm this result for dierent types of shocks by observing
the left-hand side of Figure 4, that illustrates the total amount of extractions until ta with
respect to the value of the shock, r1 − r2. We note that the impatience eect increases
the higher the shock but this increase is more important in the PO and OL cases than
in the FB case. This could be interpreted as the fact that an increase in the "impatience
eect" is less needed when considering the "strategic" externality, because extractions in
the FB case are already very important in the beginning of the exercise. This is due to the
fact that farmers have more information about the state of the result in the FB case and
then they may react earlier to the shock. Finally, we can study the dierences in welfare
between solutions in [0, ta] (see Table 5, columns 2, 4, 6 and 8, last three rows): welfare
obtained from PO-OL and OL-FB strategies vary in a non-monotonic way with respect to
the value of the shock, reaching sometimes negative values. Again, the pareto optimum
is not the most protable solution, if we analyze the problem in [0, ta]. OL is performing
better until the 20th year of exploitation. We will see in next section that the ranking of
solutions in [0, ta] is driven by a change on ta.
7These numbers are obtained by deducting total extractions before ta for a shock of 210 Mm
3/year and
a shock of 70 Mm3/year, more specically, by computing the dierences 9 757-9 672, 8 810-8 383 and 6









Figure 4: Total amount of extractions until ta in millions of Mm
3 with respect to the value
of the shock r1 − r2 (left-hand side) and the date of occurrence (ta) (right-hand side), for
the FB, OL and PO cases.
5.2.2 Variation of the date of the shock
After the analysis and estimation of extraction behavior in the dierent cases according
to the intensity of the shock, we study the dierent solutions with respect to the date of
occurrence of the shock. In Figure 5, we observe optimal solutions of stock G∗(t) (on the
left) and pumping rate g∗(t) (on the right), in particular the pareto optimal (in green),
the open loop (in blue) and the feedback solutions (in red), for a shock of mid-intensity of
70 millions of cubic meters per year (Mm3/year), i.e. r1 − r2= 70 Mm3/year occurring in
the 5th year of exploitation (ta = 5 years). In what follows, we compare this shock with
the previous shock illustrated in Figure 1, which has the same intensity but takes place 15
years later.
In the long-run, steady state stocks do not depend on the date of occurrence of the
shock as we note in the analytical solutions (equations (15), (16) and (17)). Individual
welfare does change with the date of occurrence of the shock, as shown in Table 6. We note










Figure 5: Solutions of G∗(t) (left-hand side) in millions of cubic meters and g∗(t) (right-
hand side) in millions of cubic meters per year : the pareto optimum (in green), the
open-loop (in blue) and the feedback cases (in red), when r1 − r2 = 70 and ta = 5 years.
(see columns 3, 5, 7 and 9 of the rst three rows in Table 6). Logically, farmers are better
o, if recharge rates are higher for longer times. The same result is obtained when we
compute dierences between solutions (see Table 6, columns 3, 5, 7 and 9, of the last three
rows). As an example, the loss in total welfare derived from private exploitation (feedback
solution) with respect to optimal exploitation, is greater of 3 855 thousands of Euros when
the shock occurs in ta = 20, instead of occurring earlier at ta = 5. Hence, the later the
shock occurs, the greater the dierences in welfare between solutions and therefore the
greater the ineciency. Farmers have more time to deploy their non-cooperative strategies
and hence foster ineciencies.
Next, if we do again an analysis of protability in terms of stocks and welfare in [0, ta],
we conrm that until the arrival of the shock, total extractions are higher in the FB case
(4 254 Mm3) than in the OL (3 328 Mm3) and PO (1 845 Mm3) cases. Moreover, they are
less important than in the previous shock that occurs at ta = 20. We note that this result
is monotonic in time as shown in the right-hand side of Figure 4. In terms of welfare, we
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ta 0 5 20 50
[0, ta] [0, ∞] [0, ta] [0, ∞] [0, ta] [0, ∞] [0, ta] [0, ∞]
PO 0 133 375 48 912 138 348 111 462 146 658 144 321 152 021
OL 0 120 991 68 017 125 350 114 886 132 265 133 402 137 086
FB 0 101 058 70 268 104 725 101 039 109 180 109 876 111 594
PO-OL 0 12 384 - 19 105 12 998 -3424 14 393 11 219 14 935
OL-FB 0 19 933 - 2 251 20 625 13 847 23 085 23 526 25 492
PO-FB 0 32 317 - 21 356 33 623 10 423 37 478 34 745 40 427
Table 6: Welfare (and dierences of welfare) obtained by the PO, OL and FB strategies
(respectively between solutions) (in thousands of Euros) for a shock of value r1 − r2 = 70
Mm3 and dierent dates of occurrence.
can see in Table 6 (rst three rows, columns 2, 4, 6 and 8) that welfare obtained in [0,ta]
increases the later the shock occurs. This is linked to the fact that extractions are also
more important when the shock takes place later for each information structure. However,
if we analyze dierences between solutions in [0,ta] (see last three rows of columns 2,4,6
and 8 in Table 6), these are negative when the shock occurs at an earlier date (ta = 5).
Until the 5th year of exploitation, the feedback solution seems to be the most protable
strategy but it is not the optimal solution over the whole time horizon.
To briey summarize this section, we have shown that in the long term (in [0, ∞)),
ineciency from private exploitation can be reduced when water availability decreases.
If we analyze the problem until the 5th year of exploitation of the aquifer, the feedback
adaptation behaviors perform best, as they react earliest to the shock. Indeed, this is logical
as feedback solutions correspond to the strategies where most information is available. If
we analyze the problem until the 20th year of exploitation, open-loop strategies are most
protable. Finally, over the whole time horizon, the pareto optimum is the most ecient
solution.
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6 Conclusions and discussion
We have extended the analysis of a regime shift made in de Frutos Cachorro et al. (2014) [1]
by taking into account dierent externalities which arise in the exploitation of a common
groundwater resource, i.e. the dynamic and strategic interactions between users of the
resource. Moreover, we have added to the existing literature which compares private and
optimal exploitation of groundwater resources (Negri (1989) [8], Rubio and Casino (2001)
[12]) the consideration of regime shifts following a decrease on the recharge rate of the
aquifer.
We rstly show analytically that pumping cost and strategic eects decrease the greater
the intensity of the shock. In order words, steady-state stock solutions get closer, and then
ineciency of private exploitation, dened as the dierence between the pareto optimal and
the feedback solutions, is reduced when the resource becomes more scarce. This result can
seem counter-intuitive at rst sight, but is in the same line with the Gisser and Sánchez
eect (e.g. [4]). In their paper, Gisser and Sánchez prove that if the storage capacity
(area of the aquifer times storativity) of the aquifer goes to innity the dierence between
private and optimal solutions goes to zero. In their model, the recharge of the aquifer
and the storage capacity dene the evolution of the water table height, through an inverse
relationship. In our context, instead of considering the problem of a big groundwater area
we consider the problem of relling the aquifer with small quantities of water. Although
pumping cost and strategic eects decrease with greater shocks, there might still be need
for policy intervention. We show analytically how the optimal quota should be imposed in
order to correspond to the pareto optimal extraction path.
Next, we apply our game for the particular case of the Western la Mancha (WLM)
aquifer. In the last decades, the WLM aquifer witnessed a critical decrease in water-table
levels, due to the development of intensive irrigated agriculture, coupled with inecient
management regimes. Following the reasoning of Gisser and Sánchez in [4], a welfare
analysis is necessary to justify an intervention in the management system.
We conrm that private solutions are inecient compared to the pareto optimum, not
only in terms of stocks but also in terms of welfare. In particular, in terms of stocks, the
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consideration of the strategic externality (feedback solution) exacerbates the overexploita-
tion of the resource with respect to open loop strategies. These results are in agreement
with the existing literature (Negri (1989) [8], Rubio and Casino (2001) [12]). Moreover,
the ineciency of private exploitation in terms of welfare decreases the higher the value of
the shock and the earlier the shock occurs. This may be explained by the fact that there
is less water to share in the future, and respectively, less time to compete for water and
this is why the ineciency cannot develop as easily as in a case with greater water avail-
ability. Nevertheless, the policy implication of our analysis is that a regulation through
a centralized management of the Western la Mancha aquifer is still justied, because the
pareto optimal solution allows positive eciency gains, even though these gains are less
important than in a case without shocks.
We also analyze how the ineciency of private solutions is distributed over time. As in
de Frutos Cachorro [1], we show that there is an "impatience eect", that is an increase in
extractions before the occurrence of the shock. This "impatience eect" is more important
in the FB case than in the PO and OL cases, increasing ineciency in the most plausible
non-cooperative solution. However, the FB solution is less inuenced by an increase of
the value of the shock than SO and OL solutions because farmers are already exploiting
the resource stock more heavily in the beginning of the exercise than in the other solution
cases. Indeed, farmers have extra information about the stock levels in the FB case, and
then could adapt earlier to the shock. When the shock arrives at an earlier date, the FB
(and then the OL solution) is the solution which entails the greatest gains in the short
run, i.e. before the occurrence of the shock. This can explain why private farmers could
be attracted by this solution. Nevertheless, the pareto optimum remains the most ecient
solution over the entire time horizon. As we have mentioned previously, in order to bring
the individual farmer to adopt the optimal solution path, licences could be imposed to
bring the farmer from the FB solution path back to the PO solution path. Of course, those
policies rely entirely on the individual farmer's faith to be compensated in future periods.
Some possible extensions of the article should also be mentioned. Firstly, we can
introduce uncertainty in the model, for example on the date of the shock, as realized in [1],
or on the intensity of the shock. Secondly, we could consider the date and the intensity of
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the shock as decision variables of the resource manager8. To tackle this issue it would be
necessary to redene the objective function taking into account the goal of water extraction.
As the objective is dened currently, it is optimal to never implement the shock. With
an objective that takes into account the trade-o between delivering water to farmers or
to other users, the socially optimal date and intensity of the shock could be computed.
Mathematically, such a problem could be solved in a Stackelberg game. We can also study
as in Tsur and Zemel (2004) [14] an endogenous shock, that is an event whose occurrence is
determined solely by the exploitation policy. Finally, it would be interesting to introduce
heterogeneities between groups of farmers.
8We thank an anonymous referee for indicating this possibility.
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A Resolution for the open-loop case
We are going to solve the open-loop case proceeding rstly between ta and∞. The Hamil-
tonian of this problem is:


















= 0 ⇒ a
b
− z + cG− 1
bθi




+ ρπi ⇒ π̇i = −cgi + ρπi. (23)
The equilibrium of the open-loop game is obtained by solvingM strategies which verify
the conditions (22) and (23) (i=1..M), i.e. a linear system of 2M equations. To simplify
the analytical resolution of the problem, we assume that players are symmetric, θi =
1
M ,
g = gi and π = πi. From (22), we nd the optimal rate of extraction as a function of the




(a− zb+ cbG− πb(1− α)). (24)
Substituting (24) in the second part of equation (12) and adjoint variable (23), we have
the following dynamic system:




(−c(a− zb)− c2bG+ cb(1− α) + ρM)π, (26)
which allows us to nd the roots of the characteristic polynom:
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β1,2 =




ρ2M2 + cb(1− α)(−2M(1− α)cb+ c(1− α)b(1 +M2) + 2ρM(1 +M))
2M
. (27)






















Assuming parameters are positives, g∞ and π∞ (equations (28) and (29)) have always
positives values. Moreover, in what follows, we assume parameters such as the value of
G∞ (equation (30)) is also positive.
Finally, we nd optimal extraction path with β2, the negative root:






eβ2(t−ta)(Gta −GOL∞ ), (32)









(r2 − β2(Gta −GOL∞ )), (34)
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which is obtained from equations (22) and (25).
In a second step, we will solve the problem between 0 and ta. In this period, the
Hamiltonian of the problem is described by:














We use the same principle of resolution than previously. We have rst order conditions
(equations (21), (22), (23) with r2 = r1) by applying the maximum principle. Moreover,
we assume that players are symmetric.
In a nite horizon problem, we write solutions as described below:
GOL−(t) = C1e
β1t + C2e




Substituting GOL−(t) and πOL−(t) (equations (36) and (37)) in rst order conditions
(22), (23), and taking into account boundary conditions G(0) = G0 and π(ta) = π
OL+(ta),
we obtain a system of 6 equations with 6 unknowns (Ci, Di with i=1,2,3). We nd the
following solutions to the system:9
C1 =
−(1− α)b(−ρMcr1 + ρMc(1− α)2bπta − (1− α)c2br1)− c2eβ2taρM(1− α)bG0
D1
+ceβ2taρM(r1 + (1− α)zb− (1− α)a) + cr1Mβ2 − (1− α)ρM2πta(β2 − ρ) + c2eβ2tab(1− α)r1
D1
+ceβ2taρM(r1 + (1− α)zb− (1− α)a) + cr1Mβ2 − (1− α)ρM2πta(β2 − ρ))
D1
, (38)





−(−ρM − cb(1− α) + β2M)(−c2b2(1− α)2r1 − ρMeβ1tacb(1− α)G0(β1 + cb(1− α))
D2




D2 = cb(1− α)ρM((β2 − ρM − cb(1− α) +Mβ2)),
+cb(1− α)(eβ2tacb(1− α) + eβ1ta(−cb(1− α)(β2 − ρ)M)),
C3 =
ρM(r1 − (a− zb)(1− α)) + cb(1− α)r1
cb(1− α)ρM
, (40)
and πta described in equation (34). Finally, taking into account that G(t) is a continuous
function (GOL−(ta) = G
OL+(ta)), we nd optimal solutions for the open loop game, that
is GOL(t), gOL(t) and πOL(t).
B Resolution of the feedback case
Now, for the feedback case, we solve as previously rst the problem between ta and ∞.








with Fi(G, gi) (equation (8)), constrained by the dynamics




ajG+ bj) + r, (42)
with r = r2 and conditions (11) and G(ta) = Gta.
For each player i (i = 1..M) the optimal value of the resource, V i(G), have to verify
the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation:
ρV i(G) = max
gi




gj))), i = 1..M, (43)
with
V i(G) = AG2 +BG+ C, (44)
gj = ajG+ bj . (45)
Assuming that players are symmetric, we rewrite the equation (43) as follows:
ρV i(G) = max
gi
(Fi(G, gi)− V iG(G)(r2 − (1− α)(gi + (M − 1)gj))), i = 1..M, (46)
Next, solving the problem on the right hand-side of (46), we nd the optimal pumping













a− zb− b(1− α)B
M
, (49)
and A and B in equation (85), appendix D.
Substituting now g∗i on the right hand-side of (46) and equalizing the left and hand
sides of the equation, we obtain optimal values of coecients A, B and C of V i with
regards to variables aj and bj , the coecients of the pumping rate function of player j
(j 6= i). Moreover, replacing A∗ and B∗ (see formulas in (85)) in equations (48) and (49),
and taking into account that players are symmetric, that is, g1(t)=gi(t) for any t = ta..∞
(and then a1=ai and b1=bi for any i, (i = 1..M), we nd optimal values of coecients of
the pumping rate function of the individual player, a∗1 and b
∗
1.
Finally, substituting a∗1 and b
∗




i for any i, (i = 1..M) in
the dynamics of the aquifer (42) with r = r2, we may solve the dierential equation (42),
constrained by condition G(ta) = Gta. Thus, we obtain optimal solutions of the feedback
problem, GFB+(t), gFB+(t) and the optimal value function V ∗(G) in [ta,∞):
GFB(t) = e−M(1−α)a
∗



















1 described in equations (48) and (49).
32
Next, we solve the problem between 0 and ta. The value function of the problem of
player i, V i(t, G) 10 veries the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation:





gj))), i = 1..M, (53)
with
V i(t, G) = A(t)G2 +B(t)G+ C(t), (54)
gj(t) = aj(t)G+ bj(t), (55)
and the transversality condition,
V i(ta, Gta) = V
+(Gta). (56)
The value of V +(Gta) is obtained from the rst step of resolution of the problem, and
is described in equation (51). To solve the second step of the problem, we are going to use
a similar process as previously. The challenge here lies in the fact that strategies of players
depend on the stock of the resource G and on functions aj(t) and bj(t) in an independent
way. So, the resolution of the problem is largely numerical.
Once again, assuming players are symmetric, we rewrite (53) as
ρV i(t, G)−V it (t, G) = maxgi
(Fi(G, gi)−V iG(G)(r1−(1−α)(gi+(M−1)gj)), i = 1..M, (57)
and we solve the right part of equation (57). We then nd the expression (47) that is
the optimal pumping rate of player i, g∗i (t), with ai = ai(t) and bi = bi(t), described in
equations (48), (49) and A = A(t), B = B(t), which are now functions that depend on t.
Now, substituting g∗i (t) in the right part of equation (53), and equalizing the right and
left parts of the equation, we have to solve a system of 3 dierential equations in A(t), B(t)
10We remind that in this type of problem with a nite horizon planning, the value function has to be
described as a function that depends on G and t independently.
33
and C(t), which are coecients of the value function V (t, G), between t = 0 and t = ta,
(see equation (54)), taking into account boundary conditions:
A(ta) = A
∗, B(ta) = B
∗, C(ta) = C
∗,
derived from the transversality condition (56):
V −(Gta, ta) = A(ta)G
2
ta +B(ta)Gta + C(ta) = V
+(Gta).
At this stage, we obtain A∗(t) and B∗(t) by a numerical approximation method. Sub-
stituting A∗(t) and B∗(t) in expression g∗i (t), we nd the optimal values of coecients
b∗(t) and a∗(t) of the pumping rate. Next, we substitute these values in the equation of
motion (42) with r = r1. Finally, we obtain the numerical solution of the feedback problem
between 0 and ta, that is G
FB−(t) and gFB−(t), where the initial condition G(0) = G0, is
given.
C Resolution of the pareto optimum
To solve this problem, we separate it into two parts and proceed by backward induction.










with Fi(G, gi) (equation (8)), constrained by equation (9) with r = r2 and conditions (11)
and G(ta) = Gta.














where λ is the adjoint variable. Applying the maximum principle and assuming interior








gi − (z − cG)− λ(1− α) = 0, i = 1..M, (59)
λ̇ = −∂H
∂G
+ ρλ ⇒ λ̇ = −c
M∑
i=1
gi + ρλ, i = 1..M. (60)
We assume that players are symmetric in order to simplify the analytical resolution of
the problem. Thus, θi =
1
M and g = gi.
From (59), we nd the optimal extraction volume as a function of the resource stock




(a− zb+ cbG− λb(1− α)). (61)
Substituting (61) in the second part of equation of motion (12) and equation of adjoint
variable (60), we have the following dynamic system:
Ġ = r2 − (1− α)(a− zb)− cb(1− α)G+ λb(1− α)2, (62)
λ̇ = −c(a− zb)− c2bG+ (cb(1− α) + ρ)λ, (63)




ρ2 + 4cb(1− α)ρ
2
. (64)
From equations (61), (62) and (63), with Ġ = 0 and λ̇ = 0, we nd the steady state of






















Since we assume that all parameters are positive, g∞ and λ∞ (equations (65) and (66))
are always positive. Moreover, in what follows, we consider parameters such that G∞
(equation (67)) is positive.
Finally, we have the optimal extraction paths from t = ta, with ρ2, the negative root:
GPO+(t) = eρ2(t−ta)(Gta −G∞) +G∞, (68)



















ρ2(Gta −G∞), Gta unknown.
Substituting (68) and (70) in problem (58), we can compute the scrap value, φ(Gta)
11:





−r2ρ(4cb(1− α) + ρ) + ρ2(1− α)(a− zb) + 4cb(1− α)2ρ(a− zb)
ρ(1− α)2b(η + ρ+ 4cb(1− α))
+
(2cb(1− α) + ρ)r2η − ρ(1− α)η(a− zb))
ρ(1− α)2b(η + ρ+ 4cb(1− α))
, (72)
ι = − c(−4cb(1− α)− ρ+ η)






ρ+ 4bc(1− α). (74)
11We nd that the expression φ(ta,Gta) does not have the independent term ta. In what follows, we
write the scrap value function, φ(Gta).
12We do not detail expression of ε because it is not necessary for the resolution of the problem, but it is
available from the authors upon request
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We now turn to the second part of the problem, between 0 and ta, considering the






−ρt dt+ e−ρtaφ(ta, Gta) (75)
Ġ = −(1− α)
M∑
i=1
gi + r1 (76)
G(0) = G0 given, (77)




= 2ιGta + κ,














where λ is the adjoint variable. Applying the maximum principle and assuming interior
solutions, we have the usual rst order conditions (59) and (60). From this and equation
of the motion of the state (76), we have the system of dierential equations:
Ġ = r1 − (1− α)(a− zb)− cb(1− α)G+ λb(1− α)2, (78)
λ̇ = −c(a− zb)− c2bG+ (cb(1− α) + ρ)λ. (79)












ρ2ta +B3 = 2ιGta + κ, (82)
and ρ1, ρ2 described in equation (64). This constitutes a system of 6 equations and
6 unknowns, which we can solve to nd optimal solutions for the problem for the rst








r(ta) + τ), i=1,2,
with,
C11 =
b(1− α)(ρc(r1 + (1− α)eρ2ta(a− zb)− r1eρ2ta)− ρ2cr1)
D1
+




b(1− α)2ρ(ρ2 − ρ− cb(1− α))
D1
,
D1 = ρ((ρ2−ρ)eρ1tacb(1−α)+c2b2(1−α)2(eρ2ta−eρ1ta)−cb(1−α), ρ1eρ1ta+ρ1eρ1ta(ρ2−ρ)),
C21 =
−(cb(1− α) + ρ− ρ2)(ρ1eρ1taρ((1− α)(a− zb)− r1)
D2
+
c2b2(1− α)2(G0ρ+ r1 − r1eρ1ta)
D2
,




(cb(1− α) + ρ− ρ2)(cb2(1− α)3ρ)
D2
,
13We do not provide detailed solutions of Bi (i = 1..3) because the equations are too long and they are
not necessary for the proofs, however, they are available from the authors upon request.
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D2 = cb(1− α)ρ((ρ2 − ρ)cb(1− α)eρ1ta + c2b2(1− α)2(eρ2ta − eρ1ta))
+cb(1− α)ρ(−cb(1− α)eρ1taρ1 − ρeρ1taρ1 + eρ1taρ1ρ2),
and,
A3 = −
r1ρ− ρa+ ρzb+ ραa− ραzb+ cr1b− cr1bα
bρ(α− 1)c
. (83)
Finally, considering the continuity of the function of the variable state, i.e. GPO−(ta) =
GPO+(ta), we obtain optimal solution of the stock G
PO(t) and water pumping gPO(t) for
the pareto optimum problem.
D Steady states and proofs of propositions

















M [2 c(1− α)− ρ/b] +
√
W
4(2M − 1)(1− α)2
, B =
−2A [Mr2 −M(a− bz)(1− α)]− c(a− bz)










+ 4(M − 1)2(1− α)2c2 > 0.
Stability condition implies that 2A < c1−α and then a1 > 0. To obtain G
FB
∞ > 0 from


























To have GPO∞ > 0 and G
OL
∞ > 0 for all r2 we must impose −a+ bz > 0.

























This is immediate from equations (15) and (16) for the pareto optimal and the open-
loop cases. Assuming −a+ bz > 0, it is enough to prove that the derivatives of expressions
described in these equations with regard to r2 are bigger than 0.
In the feedback case, replacing expressions of equation (85) in (84) and dierentiating





b(1− α) [c− 2A(1− α)]
> 0,
due to the stability condition.
D.3 Proof of proposition 2:
Sign of GFB∞ −GOL∞ and GOL∞ −GPO∞ .
Firstly, from equation (19), It is evident that
GOL∞ −GPO∞ < 0
.
Next, replacing expressions of equation (85) in (20), we can see that
GFB∞ −GOL∞ = −

































D.5 Proof of proposition 4:
We have to prove that g = gPO is a solution of the feedback problem constraint by g ≤
ḡ(G) = gPO.
We solve as previously rst the problem between ta and ∞. Considering the symmetric
case, V PO+(G) and gPO+ are the solutions of the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation:
ρV PO+(G) = max
g




− V PO+G (G)(1− α) = 0,∀G, (87)
ρV PO+(G) = MF (gPO+, G) + V PO+G (G)(r − (1− α)Mg
PO+),∀G, (88)
and r = r2.
Likewise, V FB+(G) and gFB+(G), constraint by a quota ḡ(G) are the solution of the
Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation of player i:
ρV FB+(G) = max
g≤ḡ







− V FB+G (G)(1− α)− µ = 0, ∀G, µ ≥ 0, (89)
ρV FB+(G) = F (gFB+, G) + V FB+G (G)(r − (1− α)Mg
FB+), ∀G, (90)
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and r = r2.
The objective is to nd ḡ(G) such that gFB+ = gPO+.
We propose that V FB+(G) = V PO+/M and gFB+ = gPO+. By rewriting (89), with




− V PO+G (G)(1− α)−Mµ = 0, ∀G, µ ≥ 0. (91)
We want to prove that ḡ = gPO+ is the optimal quota of the above problem, i.e., there
exists µ > 0 such that (91) holds. Using equations (87) and (91), we obtain:
(M − 1)∂F (g
PO+, G)
∂g
−Mµ = 0,∀G, µ > 0.
Thus, µ can be dened by:
µ =









then µ > 0, and ḡ = gPO+.
In a similar way, using the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation in a nite time horizon with
a scrap value, we can show that g = gPO− is a solution of the feedback problem with quota
restriction ḡ = gPO− between 0 and ta.
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